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The Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because the 
appeal was not timely filed.1 The Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision on 
October 28, 1992. (R. 23-27). On November 16, 1992 Knowledge 
Data Systems ("Petitioner") filed a Request for Reconsideration. 
(R. 20-22). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a), a 
party is required to file a petition for judicial review "within 
30 days after the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b 14(3) (a). The order is issued when 
signed by the Commission. See Dusty's Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992). 
Section 63-46b-13 allows a party to file a request for 
reconsideration with the agency "within 20 days after the date 
that an order is issued. . . if the order would otherwise 
constitute a final agency action. . .." However, under 63-46b-
13(3)(b)(1992) an order denying a request for reconsideration is 
deemed to be issued 20 days after the filing of the request if no 
action is taken by the agency. 
On November 16, 1992, Petitioner filed its Request for 
Reconsideration on the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992 Final 
*. Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional in nature 
and can be raised at any time during the appellate proceedings. 
See Leonczvnski v. Indus. Comm'n. 713 P.2d 706 (Utah 1985). 
1 
Decision. (R. 20-22). No action was taken by the Tax Commission 
within 20 days from the date the Petition for Reconsideration was 
filed. Therefore, pursuant to the express language of § 63-46b-
13(3)(b), an order denying Petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration was deemed to have been issued on December 7, 
1992. However, Petitioner can still " . . . file a Petition for 
judicial review within 30 days after the order . . . is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)." 
As such, Petitioner should have filed an appeal of that order by 
January 6, 1993. Petitioner did not file for judicial review 
until February 12, 1993, which is beyond the 30 day statutory 
limit. (R. 6). Accordingly, the appeal is untimely and the 
Court lacks jurisdiction. 
It should be noted that Petitioner's attorney, Gary Kueltzo, 
noted some concern regarding the deemed denial period as 
evidenced in his letter to the Tax Commission on December 10, 
1992.2 (R. 13). This letter indicates that Petitioner's 
attorney was familiar with the Utah Tax Code and understood the 
effect of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b). However, Petitioner 
cannot rely on the fact that its attorney's letter, which raises 
the 20 day deemed denial issue, serves to extend the time for 
judicial review. 
2
 The original copy of Gary Kueltzo's December 10, 1992, 
letter shows handwriting presumably from Alan Hennebold, Utah State 
Tax Commission Hearing Officer, stating the following: "Called 12-
14-92. 2 p.m. Left answer w/K's sec." 
2 
First, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) specifically states that 
an agency does not have the authority to extend the time 
requirements allowed for judicial review. Utah Code Ann* § 63-
46b-l(9) states: 
"Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict 
a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from 
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in 
this chapter, except those time periods established for 
judicial review." (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court recently held that the Tax 
Commission cannot expand the time period established for judicial 
review. See Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 
7 (Utah 1992). Therefore, because both the statute and case 
authority forbid state agencies from extending the time for 
judicial review, Petitioner cannot claim that an extension had 
been granted by the Tax Commission merely because its attorney 
mentioned the deemed denial period in a letter. 
Furthermore, although the Tax Commission eventually issued 
its January 15, 1993 Order confirming the denial of the 
Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration, this Order does not 
have the effect of extending Petitioner's rights to obtain 
judicial review since the request for reconsideration was deemed 
to have been denied by operation of law on December 7, 1992. The 
language of § 63-46b-l(9) expressly prohibits such action. 
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Hase v. Hase, 775 
P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Hase involved an appeal from a 
district court decision, but its reasoning is applicable to the 
3 
facts of the case at bar. In Hase the court issued a final 
divorce decree on December 31, 1987, which disposed of all the 
Petitioner's claims. On January 15, 1989, the Petitioner filed a 
tardy "Objection to Order" pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). On 
February 5, 1988, the district court issued a "consolidated 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, decree of divorce, and 
order." Petitioner then filed an appeal on March 4, 1988. 
The Petitioner in Hase argued that its appeal was timely 
since it was filed within 30 days of the district court's 
February 5, 1988 decision. This Court rejected this argument by 
stating: 
The Consolidated Decree of Divorce and Orders 
merely reiterated what the court had 
previously ordered in several different 
orders, referred to those orders specifically 
by date in most instances, and joined them in 
one document, as appellants request. We find 
that such an order cannot be used to extend 
the time for appeal because it does not 
resolve any issues extant, but merely refers 
to prior orders of the court. 
Id. at 945. (Emphasis added). 
The Petitioner in Hase also argued that its tardy "Objection 
to Order" should stay the 30 day filing requirement for an 
appeal. This Court rejected that argument as well, stating that 
because the objection was not filed within 10 days as required, 
the objection did not qualify as a post-judgment order, which 
would have suspended the time for appealing the December 31, 1987 
final order. Id.; see also Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 
4 
(Utah 1982) (a tardy request for a new trial cannot stay the time 
limits imposed upon appeals); Vanionora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d 
364, 517 P.2d 1320 (1974) (failure to file a motion for a new 
trial does not stay the time constraints governing appeals).3 
Both the relevant statutes and the cited case law support 
the proposition that the agency has no authority to extend the 
time for judicial review. As cited earlier, it is jurisdictional 
in nature, not procedural. As such, Petitioner is unable to 
argue that filing within 30 days of the Tax Commission's January 
15, 1993 Order was timely. Utah courts have strictly enforced 
the time requirements for the filing of an appeal. In Isaacson 
v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to extend the 30 day time limit for filing an appeal that 
was filed two days beyond the time limit. Moreover, in Dusty's 
Inc., the Utah Supreme Court also held that the 30 day time limit 
runs from the date of the issuance of the final decision, not the 
date of notice to the parties. 
The Legislature has established the time frame for seeking 
judicial review of agency action. By specifically tying the time 
to file for review to the date a motion for reconsideration is 
deemed denied, the legislature has set a time certain within 
3
 Federal courts have long recognized that tardy motions for 
reconsideration cannot toll the statute of limitations governing 
appeals even if the trial court hears the motion for 
reconsideration. See Denlev v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733 
F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 
1988); Martinez v. Trainer, 556 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977). 
5 
which an appeal must be filed. It has specifically prohibited 
the Commission from extending that time. Therefore, the issuance 
of a written order confirming that a motion for reconsideration 
has been denied, by operation of law, cannot have the effect of 
extending the time to seek judicial review. The provisions of § 
63-46b-14(3)(a) are tied to the provisions of § 63-46b-13(3)(b), 
to ensure that a petition for reconsideration does not 
indefinitely delay the time for filing for an appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. The Tax Commission properly concluded that Petitioner's 
subsequent use of the computer equipment taken in trade was 
subject to Utah use taxes. 
A, The proper standards of review for all issues 
raised in this case under UAPA is the "abuse of discretion" 
standard for statutory interpretation and "not supported by 
substantial evidence" standard for findings of fact. 
Standard of Review: The Court should review this factual 
determination under the "substantial evidence" standard pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), or under § 59-1-610 (1992 
Supp. 1993). 
II. Petitioner cannot rely upon the "isolated or occasional 
sale exemption" because Petitioner acquired the used computer 
equipment in trade, not from a sale. 
Standard of Review: The Court should review the Tax 
Commission's application of the facts to the law under the "abuse 
6 
of discretion standard" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i) or under § 59-1-610/ 
III. Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
A. Issues not raised in the proceedings below cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
B. Petitioner's § 1988 claim is improper because Utah 
law provides an adequate remedy to address erroneous tax 
assessments. 
C. The Tax Assessed Against Petitioner Does Not 
Violate the Commerce Clause Nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Standard of Review: The Court should review this question of 
law by applying the "correction of error" standard pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Set forth verbatim in Appendix 1. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) (1992). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1992). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14) (1992). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992). 
5. Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992) 
*. If this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610, 
which became effective on May 3, 1993, the applicable standard of 
review to be applied to conclusions of law. Mixed questions of law 
and fact should be determined based on implied or implicit grants 
of discretion pursuant to Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983). 
7 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
8. Utah Admin. R. 86-19-72S (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a sales and use tax assessment against 
Knowledge Data Systems, Inc. ("Petitioner") for its failure to 
remit sales and use taxes for its subsequent use of computer 
equipment taken in trade. An audit conducted by the Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission revealed that 
Petitioner was liable for $15,396.99 plus interest for its use of 
the computei: equipment. The case was submitted to the Tax 
Commission upon stipulated facts and oral arguments on April 13, 
1992. The Tax Commission held that Petitioner was the ultimate 
consumer of the computer equipment and upheld the tax assessment 
against Petitioner. Petitioner subsequently filed a Request for 
Reconsideration, which was deemed denied on December 7, 1992, and 
subsequently confirmed on January 15, 1993. Petitioner appealed 
the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992, Final Decision and the 
January 15, 1993 Order denying Petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration to the Utah Supreme Court. The case was 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on May 17, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Stipulated Facts 
This case was submitted to the Tax Commission on the 
stipulated facts and the arguments of the parties at the formal 
8 
hearing. Both parties agree and stipulate to the following 
facts: 
1. That Knowledge Data Systems, Inc. ("Petitioner") is in 
the business of selling computer systems (hardware and software) 
at retail both inside and outside Utah. (R. 47). 
2. That Petitioner sold a computer system to the 
University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic (hereinafter "U. 
Minn.") and took in trade used computer hardware which 
Petitioners had previously sold to them. (R. 47). 
3. That U. Minn, is not in the business of selling new or 
used computer hardware, but rather is a patient care facility. 
(R. 48). 
4. That the equipment Petitioner took in trade was used by 
Petitioner in its business in Utah and was booked to a fixed 
asset account and was not held for subsequent sale in an 
inventory account. (R. 48). 
5. That I.C.I. America's (hereinafter " ICI") is in the 
business of selling wholesale pharmaceutical supplies and is not 
in the business of selling new or used computer hardware. (R. 
48). 
6. That Petitioner purchased used computer hardware from 
ICI in conjunction with providing a new computer system to ICI. 
(R. 48). 
9 
7. That Petitioner used a portion of the computer hardware 
in its trade or business and held a portion of the hardware for 
resale in its inventory account. (R. 48). 
8. That neither U. Minn, or ICI is registered with the 
Utah Department of Revenue to sell tangible personal property at 
retail in Utah. (R. 48). 
Other Relevant Facts 
Petitioner sold new equipment to U. Minn, and as 
partial consideration for the sale, Petitioner took used computer 
equipment in trade from U. Minn. (R 24, 47-48). Furthermore, 
Petitioner sold new equipment to ICI and as partial consideration 
for the sale, Petitioner took used computer equipment in trade 
from ICI. (R. 24, 48). 
Additionally, U. Minn, did not actually sell its used 
computer equipment to Petitioner, rather, U Minn, traded in its 
used equipment as partial consideration in order to acquire new 
computer equipment from Petitioner. (R. 24, 47-48). 
Furthermore, ICI did not actually sell its used computer 
equipment to Petitioner, rather ICI traded in the used equipment 
as partial consideration in order to acquire new computer 
equipment. (R. 24, 25, 48). 
Procedural History 
The Auditing Division conducted an audit of Petitioner for 
the audit period of July 1987 through June 1990. The results of 
the audit indicated that Petitioner was liable for $15,396.99 tax 
10 
assessment. (R. 70-71). On April 15, 1991, Petitioner filed for 
redetermination with the Tax Commission in connection with the 
tax assessment. (R. 67-69). 
On April 13, 1992, the Tax Commission conducted a hearing 
for oral arguments. (Transcript). Subsequently, on October 28, 
1992 the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Final Decision. (R. 23-28). 
On November 16, 1992, Petitioner filed a Request for 
Reconsideration of the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992 Final 
Decision. (R. 20-22). However, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-14(3)(a) (1992), an order denying Petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration was deemed to have been issued on December 7, 
1992. Petitioner failed to timely file for judicial review of 
final agency action within 30 days after Petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration was deemed denied pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992). 
On January 15, 1993, the Tax Commission issued an Order 
confirming the denial of Petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration. Subsequently, on February 12, 1993, Petitioner 
filed its Petition for Review of Final Decision, wherein 
Petitioner seeks review of the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992 
Final Decision and the January 15, 1993 Order. The Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeal. 
11 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should review the Tax Commission's Final Decision 
under the "abuse of discretion" and "not supported by substantial 
evidence" standards of review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(g), and (h)(i) (1992). This Court must sustain the Tax 
Commission's finding that Petitioner did not qualify for the 
"isolated or occasional sales" exemption from sales and use taxes 
unless this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 
The record indicates that Petitioner acquired the used computer 
equipment in trade and became the ultimate consumer of the 
equipment when Petitioner used the equipment for its own business 
purposes. Therefore, because the Tax Commission's factual 
finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, this 
Court should uphold the Tax Commission's Final Decision. 
Furthermore, given the broad and general terms of the 
relevant statutes and the authority of the Tax Commission to 
administer the tax laws, the Tax Commission has been given an 
implicit grant of authority from the legislature. As such, the 
Tax Commission's finding cannot be overturned unless it has 
abused its discretion. Therefore, under the applicable standards 
of review, this Court should affirm the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision and subsequent Order. However, even if § 59-1-610 
supersedes the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") in 
this case, the court must defer to findings of the Tax Commission 
12 
since it has only made factual findings. There are no 
interpretations of law at issue. 
In the present case, the Tax Commission properly concluded 
that Petitioner's subsequent use of the computer equipment that 
it acquired in trade constituted a taxable transaction. Use or 
consumption of tangible personal property constitutes a separate 
taxable event. This conclusion is supported by statute and case 
authority. The stipulated facts indicate that Petitioner 
acquired used computer equipment in trade and subsequently used 
the equipment for its own business purposes. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992), the initial acquisition of the 
traded-in equipment is exempt from sales and use taxes. However, 
pursuant to Utah Admin. R. R865-19-72S (1992), the subsequent 
sale or use of the tangible personal property that has been 
acquired in trade constitutes a taxable transaction. Utah case 
law and other authority support the proposition that a tax is 
levied upon the ultimate consumer. In the case at bar, 
Petitioner is the ultimate consumer because it used the traded-in 
equipment for its own business purposes and did not hold the 
equipment for resale. 
Given the nature of the trade-in situation, Petitioner is 
unable to qualify for the "isolated or occasional sale" exemption 
from sales or use taxes. The facts indicate that the out-of-
state purchasers bought new computer equipment from Petitioner in 
the Petitioner's normal course of business. As partial 
13 
consideration for the new computer equipment, the out-of-state 
purchasers traded-in their old equipment. Because Petitioner 
acquired its used computer equipment under the typical trade in 
situation, Petitioner cannot claim the "isolated or occasional 
sale" exemption pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14) 
(1992). Therefore, this Court should affirm the sales and use 
taxes assessed against Petitioner as found by the Tax Commission 
in its Final Decision. 
Finally, Petitioner cannot claim relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C 
§ 1983 and § 1988 for three important reasons. First, the issue 
of attorneys' fees was never raised in the proceedings below. 
Second, because Utah provides an adequate remedy by which 
taxpayers can become whole after an erroneous assessment, this 
court should not extend a § 1988 remedy that has not been 
provided for by the legislature. Finally, pursuant to Utah law 
all tangible personal property taken in trade that is 
subsequently used or sold constitutes a taxable transaction. 
This rule is true regardless of the origin of the property. As 
such, this tax does not violate the Commerce Clause and 
therefore, Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 must be denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER'S 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE COMPUTER EQUIPMENT TAKEN IN TRADE 
WAS SUBJECT TO UTAH USE TAXES. 
A. THE PROPER STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR ALL ISSUES 
RAISED IN THIS CASE UNDER UAPA IS THE "ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION" STANDARD FOR STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND "NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE" STANDARD FOR FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") outlines the 
various situations in which a court may grant relief and the 
associated standards of review to be applied in granting such 
relief. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1992). The two 
standards of review applicable in this case are the "abuse of 
discretion" standard for statutory interpretation and "not 
supported by substantial evidence" standard for findings of fact. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), and (h)(i) (1992). 
This Court must sustain the Tax Commission's finding that 
Petitioner did not qualify for the "occasional or isolated sale" 
exemption to Utah sales and use taxes because Petitioner acquired 
used equipment in trade from U. Minn, and ICI in trade as partial 
consideration for underlying sales of new equipment. Later, 
Petitioner used the trade-in equipment for its own use. Unless 
this finding is not supported by substantial evidence, the 
Commission's decision should be upheld. Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-
16(4)(g) (1992) and Zissi v. Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
1992). 
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In applying this standard the Court must consider both the 
evidence that supports the challenged finding and the evidence 
that cuts against such finding. Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This standard does not 
permit the reviewing court to weigh of the evidence itself, but 
only requires the court to determine whether the fact finder's 
weighing was reasonable. Semeco v. Tax Comm'n, 209 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 73, 77 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
The case at bar was submitted to the Tax Commission on the 
stipulated facts and arguments of the parties at the formal 
hearing. The Tax Commission found that Petitioner sold new 
computer equipment to U. Minn, and ICI and received used 
equipment from each entity in trade as partial consideration for 
the sale of the new equipment. (R. 24). The Tax Commission also 
found that the used equipment that Petitioner took in trade was 
used in Petitioner's business operations. (R. 25). Furthermore, 
the Tax Commission also found that Petitioner's subsequent use of 
the equipment taken in trade was the taxable event. (R. 26). As 
such, the Tax Commission correctly determined that Petitioner did 
not qualify for an "isolated or occasional sale" exemption, given 
the fact that Petitioner acquired the used equipment in trade. 
(R. 27). 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously applied the 
substantial evidence standard in O'Rourke v. Tax Comm'n, 830 P.2d 
230 (Utah 1992) and affirmed a Tax Commission finding that a 
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taxpayer was domiciled in Utah and thereby subject to Utah income 
taxes. Therefore, this Court should remain consistent and 
sustain the Tax Commission's finding since it is support€>d by 
substantial evidence in the record• 
With respect to the Tax Commission's application of the 
facts to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 and § 59-12-104(14)f the 
proper standard of review is "abuse of discretion." In 
discussing this standard of review under the UAPA, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Under UAPA, this court reviews an agency decision which 
interprets statutory law using the correction of error 
standard found in section 63-46b-16(4)(d), unless the 
legislature has granted the agency discretion in 
interpreting and administering the statute. Agency 
discretion may be either express or implied and, if 
granted, results in review of the agency action for an 
abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
Nucor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992) 
(footnotes omitted).5 Thus, if either express or implied 
discretion is found, the proper standard of review is Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), which provides: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
• • • 
(h) the agency action is: 
5
. The Supreme Court has also stated, "[i]n many cases where 
we would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its 
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference on 
the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained 
in the governing statute." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). 
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(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute;• • . 
This Court in Kino v. Industrial Comm'n, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 
37 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) also articulated an analytical model 
derived from the Supreme Court cases dealing with this standard 
of review. The threshold step is to determine whether there has 
been an explicit grant from the legislature to the agency of 
deference to interpret the specific statutory language. Id. If 
there is no explicit grant of authority, the next step is to 
determine whether implicit authority is granted. Implicit 
authority can be inferred if the "statutory language is broad and 
expansive or subject to numerous interpretations. . ." Id. 
Courts have also recognized implicit authority when there is an 
absence of discernible legislative history and the agency 
determination is the type of determination the agency routinely 
performs. Putvin v. Tax Comm'n 837 P.2d 589 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), citing Morton Int'l, Inc., 814 P.2d at 592. 
In the case at bar, the legislature has granted the Tax 
Commission general discretion to administer and supervise the tax 
laws of the state. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(3), (5) (1992). 
Similarly , there is implicit discretion granted to the Tax 
Commission from the fact that sections 59-12-102(8)(a), which 
defines retail sale, and 59-12-104(14), which states the 
exemption for isolated and occasional sales, are broad and 
subject to a variety of different interpretations. Therefore, 
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this Court should apply the "abuse of discretion" standard when 
reviewing the reasonableness of the Tax Commission's 
determinations.6 
Even if this Court were to find the proper standard were an 
intermediate "correction of error," "corrections," or 
"reasonableness" standard, the Tax Commission's Final Decision 
should be affirmed. The record shows that the Tax Commission 
relied upon the parties' stipulated facts and the parties' 
arguments to determine whether Petitioner's equipment taken in 
trade was exempt from sales and use taxes. Thus, this Court must 
uphold the decision below on that basis. The Tax Commission has 
not exceeded their authority in statutory interpretationf but has 
carefully weighed and applied the stipulated facts to the 
statutory standard. 
Having framed the standard of review, the following facts 
show that the Tax Commission properly found Petitioner's 
subsequent use of the computer equipment constituted a taxable 
event. Petitioner is engaged in the business of selling computer 
systems at retail both inside and outside of Utah. (Record at 
24, 47; Transcript at 14). Petitioner sold a new computer system 
6
. If this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610, 
which became effective on May 3, 1993, the applicable standard of 
review to be applied to "mixed questions of law and fact," like the 
Tax Commission's finding that Petitioner did not qualify for the 
"isolated or occasional sales" exemption, is "abuse of discretion." 
See Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 658 P.2d 
601, 610 (Utah 1983). 
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to U. Minn, and took in trade used "computer hardware. (R. 24, 
25, 47; T. 14, 15). Additionally, Petitioner acquired a used 
computer system from ICI in conjunction with providing ICI with a 
new computer system. (R. 24, 25, 48). The equipment that 
Petitioner acquired from U. Minn, was used in its business in 
Utah, booked to a fixed asset account, and not held for resale. 
(R. 24, 48). Similarly, the equipment that Petitioner acquired 
from ICI was partially used by Petitioner in its business, 
although some of the equipment was also held for resale. (R. 24, 
48; Transcript at 11). The Tax Commission properly concluded 
that the material taken in trade and then subsequently used by 
Petitioner in its business constituted a taxable event. (R. 26). 
This conclusion is supported both by statute and case authority. 
In th€* case at bar, the tax has been assessed on 
Petitioner's subsequent use of the computer equipment that it 
took in trade, not the manner in which Petitioner acquired the 
equipment. In fact, the initial transaction by which Petitioner 
acquired the used computer equipment is exempt from sales taxes 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992). However, 
Petitioner's subsequent use of the used computer equipment for 
its own business purposes is not exempt from sales and use taxes. 
In essence, this case is analogous to the typical trade-in 
scenario when a car dealer takes in trade a used automobile as 
partial consideration for the sale of a new car, but instead of 
placing the used car on the lot for resale, the dealer uses the 
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used car for other business purposes,7 In this example, the 
trade-in transaction is not the taxable event, rather, it is the 
subsequent use or consumption of the traded-in vehicle by the 
ultimate user that constitutes the taxable event. To this issue, 
the Utah legislature created a statutory exemption for the 
initial trade-in transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) 
(1992) states: 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes 
imposed by this chapter: 
(19) tangible personal property, other than 
money, traded in as full or part payment of the 
purchase price, except that for purpose of 
calculating sales or use tax upon vehicles not 
sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins are limited 
to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon 
the then existing fair market value of the 
vehicle being sold and the vehicle traded in, as 
determined by the commission; 
For purposes of clarifying this statute, the Tax Commission 
promulgated the following rules: 
Trade-ins and Exchanges Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102 
A. An even exchange of tangible personal property for 
tangible personal property is exempt from tax. When a 
person takes tangible personal property as part payment on 
7
. Utah Code Ann. 59-12-102(14)(a), (b) (1992) defines "use" 
in the following manner: (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right 
or power over tangible personal property under Subsection 59-12-
103(1), incident to the ownership or leasing of that property, 
item, or service. (b) "Use" does not include the sale, display, 
demonstration, or trial of that property in the regular course of 
business and held for resale. See e.g., Merrill Bean Chevrolet, 
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 549 P. 2d 443 (Utah 1976) (automobiles 
used for display to stimulate sales does not constitute "use" by 
the auto dealer). 
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a sale of tangible personal property, sales or use tax 
applies only to any consideration valued in money which 
changes hands. 
B. For example, if a car is sold for $8,500 and a credit of 
$6,500 is allowed for a used car taken in trade, the sales 
or use tax applies to the difference, or $2,000 in this 
example.8 Subsequently, when the used car is sold, tax 
applies to the selling price less any trade-in at that 
time. 
C. An actual exchange of tangible personal property between 
two persons must be made before this exemption applies. . . 
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-72S (1992) (emphasis added). 
This rule broadens the scope of the trade-in exemption to 
transactions involving all forms of tangible personal property, 
not merely automobiles. As such, both the statute and the rules 
cited above are applicable to the case at bar. Petitioner 
acquired the used computer equipment as a trade-in for the 
underlying sale of new computer equipment to the out of state 
purchasers. After Petitioner acquired the traded-in equipment, 
Petitioner then used the equipment in its own business. Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992), the used equipment that 
Petitioner received in trade is exempt from sales and use taxes. 
However, pursuant to the rule that accompanies § 59-12-104(19), 
when the traded-in equipment is subsequently sold or used, a tax 
8
. Note that because Petitioner's underlying sale of its new 
equipment to the out-of-state purchasers is a "sale made in 
interstate commerce" pursuant to Utah Admin. R. R865-19-44S (1992) 
(not subject to sales tax), a tax is not levied upon the difference 
between th€> value of the new equipment and the equipment taken in 
trade. The Tax Commission similarly found that because the sales 
took place outside of Utah, no sales tax could have been levied on 
the underlying sale of the new computer equipment. (R. 26). 
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is levied upon that transaction• See Utah Admin, R. R865-19-72S 
(1992). 
Utah case law supports the proposition that sales tax 
applies to all sales of tangible personal property made to the 
ultimate consumer. Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 549 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1976); Olson Construction Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961). In 
Merrill Bean the Tax Commission assessed a tax on "demonstrator 
automobiles" that were being used by the automobile dealer's wife 
for her own personal use. Because the dealer's wife's use of the 
demonstrator vehicles was short-lived and because she helped 
stimulate sales of those vehicles, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the dealer was not the ultimate consumer despite his wife's 
personal use of the demonstrator. Merrill Bean, 549 P.2d at 446. 
However, in a case similar to the facts of Merrill Bean, 
the Georgia Supreme Court held that a taxable transaction 
occurred when a dealer's wife used a demonstrator automobile for 
her personal use for longer than a six month period. See Law 
Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Strickland, 271 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 1980). 
In discussing the concept of ultimate use by the car dealer, the 
Georgia court held that since the demonstrator vehicles were used 
for personal use as well as for display over an extended period 
of time, the dealer was liable for sales taxes as the ultimate 
consumer of the display vehicles. Id. at 154. The court also 
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stated: 
[w]hen the [car dealer] 'makes any use of the property 
other than retention, demonstration, or display while 
holding [the automobiles] for sale in the regular 
course of business, the use shall be deemed a retail 
sale by the purchaser. . ..' The [car dealer] will 
the be taxed as though he had purchased the property. 
If he thereafter sells the property to a consuming 
purchaser a tax will again be applicable to that sale. 
These, however, are two distinct sales transactions 
and are independent taxable events. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 155. Therefore, the Tax Commission's conclusion that 
Petitioner's subsequent use of the traded-in computer equipment 
is consistent with the rules imposing a tax upon the ultimate 
consumer. 
Although no Utah case has directly interpreted section 59-
12-104(19), the Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed the taxable 
effect of an automobile that was originally taken in trade and 
subsequently sold to a consumer. In City of Philadelphia v. 
Heinel Motors, 16 A.2d 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940), the court 
states: 
When the defendant corporation [Heinel Motors] 
proceeds to sell the car accepted by it in trade to a 
new purchaser, the latter enters into a totally 
distinct and separate transaction and is chargeable 
under the ordinance with the tax on the purchase made 
by him [the purchaser]. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 764. Therefore, the court indicates that a separate 
taxable event occurs on the subsequent sale of the used vehicles, 
and the tax burden is placed upon the purchaser. 
Although this case does not involve the resale of used 
automobiles taken in trade, the case does involve equipment taken 
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in trade and ultimately used by Petitioner in its business. As 
such, the reasoning behind the rules cited above apply to this 
case as well. The court in Philadelphia had to determine who the 
ultimate purchaser of the automobiles was in order to assess the 
sales tax liability. The court stated that because the sale of 
the used car was a separate and distinct transaction, the sales 
tax liability fell on the purchaser. Id. at 764. Similarly, the 
Tax Commission concluded that Petitioner was the ultimate user of 
the used computer equipment, which it took in trade. The 
equipment was booked as a fixed asset, evidencing the fact that 
Petitioner was the ultimate user of the used equipment. As such, 
the Tax Commission properly concluded that a taxable event 
occurred when Petitioner began to use the equipment for its own 
business purposes. (R. 26). 
The Tax Commission's finding that Petitioner's subsequent 
use was a taxable transaction is consistent with the general rule 
that sales tax is levied upon the ultimate consumer. Tummurru 
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 
1990); see also Ralph Child Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 
Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961). The Utah Supreme Court has 
defined "used" and "consumed" in the following manner: 
From the context of our statute "used" and "consumed" 
may be said to express the same meaning—to make use 
of, to employ and does not necessarily mean the 
immediate destruction or extermination or change in 
form of the article or commodity. 
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Utah Concrete Products v. State Tax- Comm'n, 101 Utah 513, 125 
P.2d 408, 410 (1942). Thus, under this broad definition it seems 
clear that Petitioner's subsequent use of the equipment that it 
took in trade, even though it was used for its own business 
purposes, would fit within this definition. Furthermore, because 
the used computer equipment was not held for resale, Petitioner 
becomes the last person in the chain to have used such equipment 
and the ultimate consumer liable for the tax. See Utah Concrete 
Products, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d at 411; see also Merrill Bean 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 549 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 
1976). 
Petitioner's subsequent use of the used computer equipment 
can also be compared to the situation when a construction 
contractor takes materials out of inventory for use in a 
construction contract. In Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), Tummurru was in the 
business of constructing modular buildings as well as selling 
building materials. Tummurru argued that the building materials 
that its contracting entity acquired from inventory, to be used 
in out-of-state construction projects, did not constitute a 
taxable transaction. However, the court rejected Tummurru's 
argument by stating the following: 
The act of taking the items out of inventory for use 
in a construction contract is a retail sale for the 
purpose of sales tax because the contractor is the 
ultimate consumer . . . Tummurru is therefore liable 
for the sales tax due on those items sold to its 
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contracting entity for use in 'the out-of-state 
construction projects. 
Id. at 719. 
The reasoning behind Tummurru is applicable to the case at 
bar. First, the Tummurru court determined that Tummurru was the 
ultimate consumer. Similarly, this Court should find that the 
Petitioner was the ultimate consumer.. Second, the Tummurru court 
also determined that taking the building materials out of 
inventory and subsequently using them in the construction 
projects constituted a taxable transaction. In this case, 
although Petitioner may not have booked the receipt of the used 
equipment into an inventory account, the fact remains that 
Petitioner is commonly engaged in the business of selling used 
computers that it receives in trade. Thus, each used computer 
that Petitioner receives in trade automatically goes into 
inventory whether or not this inventory account step is shown on 
the books. Further proof that traded-in equipment enters 
inventory is evidenced by the fact that a portion of the 
equipment acquired from ICI was actually placed in an inventory 
account for resale. Therefore, when Petitioner used the 
equipment that it received from U. Minn, and ICI for its business 
purposes, Petitioner essentially took the equipment from its 
inventory and became the ultimate consumer of the equipment. As 
such, the act of taking items out of inventory for subsequent use 
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by Petitioner as the ultimate consumer constitutes a taxable 
transaction. See Tummurru Trades Inc.. 802 P.2d at 719. 
In sum, Petitioner would not hesitate to admit that a 
taxable event occurs when it sells used computer equipment taken 
in trade to a third party purchaser. In the common trade-in and 
subsequent sale situation, the purchaser is the ultimate consumer 
and is liable for the sales tax. In a similar manner, Petitioner 
cannot argue that it is exempt from sales tax liability merely 
because it chose to use the equipment for its own business 
instead of choosing to place the used equipment for resale. 
In the case at bar, Petitioner constitutes the ultimate consumer 
of the used computer equipment and is therefore logically and 
legally liable for the tax. 
II. PETITIONER CANNOT RELY UPON THE "ISOLATED OR 
OCCASIONAL SALE EXEMPTION" BECAUSE PETITIONER ACQUIRED 
THE USED COMPUTER EQUIPMENT IN TRADE, NOT FROM A SALE. 
Petitioner's reliance on the "isolated or occasional sales 
by persons not regularly engaged in business" exemption from 
sales and use tax is misplaced. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(14) (1992). As the Tax Commission noted in its Final 
Decision, statutes that provide for exemptions to general 
taxation provisions are strictly construed against the taxpayer 
and the taxpayer has the burden of showing entitlement to the 
exemption. (R. 25); see also Parsons Asphalt Products v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1990). Given the 
nature of the trade-in situation in the case at bar, the Tax 
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Commission properly concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to 
this exemption. (R. 26). The facts show that Petitioner 
subsequently used the equipment that it took in trade for its own 
business purposes. Both the Utah Code and the Utah 
Administrative Rules specifically explain that the original 
trade-in is exempt from sales tax, yet the subsequent sale or 
consumption of the used equipment constitutes a taxable event. 
See Utah Code -Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992); Utah Admin. R. R865-
19-72S (1992). As such, the Tax Commission's finding that 
although the Petitioner's acquisition of the used equipment that 
it received in trade was not taxable, Petitioner's subsequent use 
of the equipment in its business constituted the taxable event 
consistent with Utah law. (R. 26). Therefore, Petitioner's 
reliance upon the "isolated and occasional sales" exemption and 
the cases that interpret that exemption are misplaced because 
Petitioner acquired the used computer equipment under a trade-in 
situation. See e.g., L.A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969) (a Utah 
construction company that purchased used construction equipment 
not of the type regularly sold in the course of the seller's 
business, and subsequently used the equipment for its own 
business qualified for the "isolated or occasional sale" 
exemption from Utah sales and use taxes); Husky Oil v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976) (a Utah oil refinery company 
that purchased used refinery equipment not of the type regularly 
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sold in the course of the seller's business, and subsequently 
used the equipment for its own qualified for the "isolated or 
occasional sale" exemption from Utah sales and use taxes); Geneva 
Steel Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949) 
(a Utah steel company that purchased a steel plant and its 
inventories located in Utah qualified for the "isolated or 
occasional sales" exemption from Utah sales and use tax). 
(Emphas i s added). 
Even if this Court were to determine that transactions in 
question constitute isolated or occasional sales, KDS would still 
not qualify under the terms of that exemption. In the present 
case it is imperative to note that KDS buys and sells computer 
equipment in its regular cause of business. These facts make the 
Geneva case distinguishable. 
In Geneva, however, neither party was engaged in buying or 
selling of tangible personal property in the regular cause of its 
business. As such, Geneva, is factually inconsistent with the 
case at bar. 
Furthermore, at the time the Geneva case was decided the 
sales tax statute and the use tax statute were separate. The 
Utah State Tax Commission made a policy decision to apply all 
sales tax exemptions to the Use Tax Act. The Court in Geneva, 
noting the legislature's inaction, simply ratified this 
procedure. Thus, the underlying rationale of Geneva is no longer 
applicable since the legislature has recently acted by combining 
30 
the two Acts into its present form. But even before the 
statutory union of the Sale and Use Tax Acts, the Geneva court 
recognized the existence of two separate taxable transactions 
when it stated: 
In the Union Portland Cement case, we narrowed 
further the scope of the use tax. But this 
narrowing did not make the Use Tax Act useless or 
a "nullity." Remaining for the use tax to 
operate upon is the storage use or other 
consumption of property purchased outside of this 
state and brought into this state for storage, 
use, or other consumption. The sale of property 
made outside this state is not subject to our 
sales tax, it being a sale which this state 
cannot constitutionally tax. But when such 
property is brought into this state for storage, 
use or other consumption here, thus coming to 
rest as an integrated part of the total property 
in this state, then the use tax comes into 
operation and taxes, not the event of the sale of 
the property, but the event of storage, use or 
other consumption of that property within this 
state, (emphasis added) Id. at 211. 
The general public policy of sales tax statutes includes 
the concept that a state is entitled to tax property coming to 
rest and being consumed within its borders. In order for 
taxpayers to avoid double taxation of tangible personal property, 
interstate agreements have been reached whereby one state will 
credit sales or use tax paid by a taxpayer for the same item of 
property in another state. Had Minnesota taxed the used computer 
equipment allegedly purchased by KDS in Minnesota, the state of 
Utah would recognize that payment and credit KDS for any amount 
of use tax owed to Utah. Therefore, KDS bears no undue risk. 
However, there is no evidence that this happened. The used 
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computer equipment which KDS has and continues to consume, 
conceivably would escape legitimate state taxation if the 
arguments of the Petitioner are accepted by this court. The 
validity of the use tax concept should not be so jeopardized. 
III. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT 
TO 42 U.S.C. S 1988. 
X. Issues Not Raised in the 
Proceedings Below Cannot Be Raised 
for the First Time on Appeal. 
Petitioner's request for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 should be summarily denied in this action. Utah 
law clearly establishes that issues not presented in the 
proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
See Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In 
its brief before this court, Petitioner raises for the first time 
the issues of a violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983 and a request for 
attorneys' fees in connection with that violation pursuant to 4 2 
U.S.C. § 1988. (Brief of Appellant at 15). However, the record 
indicates that a violation of § 1983 and attorneys' fees pursuant 
to § 1988 have not been plead or put to issue in the proceedings 
below. Therefore, this Court should reject Petitioner's request 
for attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1983. 
Petitioner may try to argue that this issue has been plead 
below in its Request for Reconsideration. (R. 22). However, 
neither that document nor the cases to which it cites mentions a 
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violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988.9 Furthermore, Petitioner cannot claim that the § 
1983 and § 1988 issues were implicitly raised in its Request for 
Reconsideration. This Court has already determined the effect of 
issues that allegedly have been "implicitly raised" in the 
proceedings below. In Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, an appellant 
urged this court to consider the issue of standing on appeal, 
stating that this issue was "broadly speaking . . . raised 
below," suggesting that the trial court "implicitly considered" 
the standing issue raised on appeal. However, this Court 
rejected the appellant's claim and denied him the opportunity to 
raise the standing issue. Id. at 1359. Likewise in this case, 
this Court should find that the § 1983 and § 1988 have neither 
expressly or implicitly been raised in the proceedings below. 
Therefore, this Court should deny Petitioner's request for 
attorneys' fees in connection with this case. 
B. Petitioner's § 1988 Claim Is 
Improper Because Utah Law Provides 
An Adequate Remedy To Address 
Erroneous Tax Assessments. 
The objective of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to interpose federal 
courts between the states and the people, as guardians of the 
peoples' federal rights. Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 
9
. Note that the case to which Petitioner cites, Kraft General 
Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S. , 120 L. Ed. 2d 59 
(1992), does not involve a sales tax issue nor does it address the 
issue of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation or § 1988 attorneys' fees 
claim. 
33 
496, 503 (1982) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 
(1972)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, § 1983 does not create 
new rights; rather, it merely facilitates enforcing certain 
federal rights by providing a federal forum. Chapman v. Houston 
Welfare Rts. Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). 
Although § 1983 challenges may have an extensive reach in 
other contexts, there are special limiting concerns when the 
dispute involves the collection and assessment of state taxes. 
The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, specifically provides 
that federal "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or 
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under 
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had 
in the courts of such State." The policies embodied within the 
Act create an impenetrable barrier to contesting state taxes in 
federal court. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNarv, 
454 U.S. 100 (1981)(federal courts cannot entertain actions for 
damages under § 1983 for alleged denial of federal constitutional 
rights in the administration of state tax laws). This barrier is 
derived from our system of federalism and comity. The United 
States Supreme Court noted the following: 
The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of 
state governments which should at all times actuate 
the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to 
interfere . . . with their fiscal operations, require 
that such relief should be denied in every case where 
the asserted federal right may be preserved without it 
(emphasis added). 
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McNarv, 454 U.S. at 108. Thus, as long as the state provides an 
adequate remedy, any challenge—including one based upon § 1983— 
cannot be brought to a federal court. McNarv, 454 U.S. at 113. 
Accordingly, the issue in the present case is whether a 
state is required by federal law to provide a forum for federal 
claims that would not otherwise be heard in a federal court. 
However, the cases cited above bolster the proposition that a 
state should have no obligation to create additional remedies 
concerning the payment of taxes beyond those provided in the 
state statutes.10 
In the instant case, the Utah legislature has already 
created an adequate and efficient remedy for taxpayers who 
contest their assessments. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301 allows 
taxpayers to pay the disputed amounts under protest and then 
bring an action in the tax division of the appropriate district 
court to determine the validity of the tax. If the decision goes 
in favor of the taxpayer, the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of 
the amount paid under protest. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301 
10
. Note that this issue has engendered much confusion 
throughout the various states. Nutbrown v. Munn, 811 P. 2d 131 (Or. 
1991)(a § 1983 challenge against state taxes was improper because 
state provided an adequate remedy); Hogan v. Muslof, 471 N.W. 2d 
216 (Wis. 1992)(a § 1983 challenge against state taxes was improper 
because the state provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy); 
but see Bung's Bar v. Township Council, 502 A.2d 1198 (N.J. Super 
1985)(state court has jurisdiction over § 1983 tax claims); 
Bloomingdale's Bv Mail Ltd. v. Huddleston, 848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 
1992) (a state granted attorney's fees under § 1983 in a state tax 
case). 
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(1992). Thus far, the Utah legislature has not incorporated the 
§ 1988 action as a remedy available for Utah taxpayers. 
Furthermore, it is a sovereign function of the legislature, and 
not the judiciary, to determine what remedies are available to 
Utah taxpayers. Thus, because there is no federal requirement 
that a state provide a remedy for contesting state taxes beyond 
the pay and sue-for-refund remedy provided in Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-301, and because the legislature has not incorporated the 
remedy under § 1988 for Utah taxpayers, Petitioner is not 
entitled to attorney's fees under his § 1988 claim. 
C. The Tax Assessed Against Petitioner 
Does Not Violate the Commerce Clause 
Nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Because this Court has discretionary power to deny 
attorneys' fees in a § 1983 claim, this Court should carefully 
consider the Tax Commission's reasoning in upholding the taxes 
assessed against Petitioner. By doing so, the Court should find 
that Petitioner's § 1983 and § 1988 claims are not warranted in 
this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
As indicated in the analysis above, the imposition of the 
tax against Petitioner does not discriminate against out-of-state 
purchases of tangible personal property. It is imperative to 
note that the underlying transaction in this case involves a 
trade-in situation, not an isolated or occasional purchase of 
tangible personal property. As such, all tangible personal 
property acquired in trade is tax exempt pursuant to Utah Code 
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Ann. § 59-12-104(19) even if the property comes from within or 
outside of this state. However, the subsequent sale or 
consumption of all traded-in property, constitutes a legitimate 
taxable transaction. Finding two separate transactions does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, because the 
tax imposed upon Petitioner's subsequent use is in no way 
connected with the manner in which Petitioner acquired the 
equipment, there can be no violation of the federal Civil Rights 
Act. 
In support of its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, Petitioner 
relates an example stating that if "Knowledge Data (Petitioner) 
had purchased used computer equipment in Salt Lake City from the 
University of Utah Hospital, no sales tax would have been 
collected from the University of Utah Hospital and no use tax 
would have been due from Knowledge Data." (Brief of Appellant at 
13). This argument is correct so long as the transaction from 
the University of Utah Hospital to Petitioner is an actual sale, 
and not a trade-in situation. However, because the facts of this 
case indicate that Petitioner acquired the used equipment as part 
of a trade-in, Petitioner's example cannot be considered as an 
appropriate analogy. In fact, if Petitioner in its example 
actually received equipment in trade from the University of Utah 
Hospital, and subsequently used the equipment for its own 
business purposes, the Auditing Division would assess a tax on 
that transaction. Therefore, Petitioner cannot claim that the 
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tax violates the Commerce Clause unfairly discriminating against 
non-Utah entities because all tangible personal property taken in 
trade is received tax exempt. The Commission is consistent in 
this case. Subsequent sale or consumption of the equipment 
constitutes a separate taxable transaction. 
Finally, this Court has already held that attorneys' fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are not allowed if a trial court 
makes an erroneous factual determination when applying the 
determination to a statutory provision. See Kelsev v. Hanson, 
818 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In Kelsev a trial court 
judge improperly determined that a plaintiff was able to bear the 
costs of filing a divorce as set out in Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3 
and § 21-7-4. On appeal the plaintiff argued that her right of 
access to the courts had been violated given the erroneous 
determination of her ability to pay, and sued to recover her 
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1988. This Court held 
that the trial court's erroneous factual determination of her 
financial status, a determination that the court was required to 
make in applying § 21-7-4, did not constitute a civil rights 
violation. Id. at 592. As such, the Court denied attorney's 
fees. Id. This Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would 
subject all erroneous state court decisions to be construed as 
civil rights violations. Id. 
In the present case, the Tax Commission made the factual 
determination that Petitioner did not qualify for the "isolated 
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or occasional" sales tax exemption given the nature of the trade-
in situation. However, if this Court finds that this factual 
determination was improper, then this Court still should not find 
that Petitioner's civil rights have been violated. Just as in 
the Kelsev case, this Court should hold that an erroneous factual 
determination applied to a statutory provision does not give rise 
to a civil rights violation or attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988. Therefore, this Court should conclude that 
Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees are not warranted in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission properly concluded that Petitioner's 
subsequent use of the used computer equipment that it acquired in 
trade did not qualify for an "isolated or occasional sales" 
exemption given the underlying nature of the transaction. The 
stipulated facts clearly show that Petitioner acquired the used 
equipment from the out-of-state purchasers as partial 
consideration for the sale of new computer equipment. Although 
the initial trade-in transaction is tax exempt pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19), the subsequent sale or use of the 
equipment constitutes a taxable event. Because Petitioner used 
the equipment for its own business purposes instead of holding 
the equipment for resale, Petitioner became the ultimate consumer 
of the equipment and is liable for the sales tax. The tax 
assessed against Petitioner does not discriminate against 
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interstate commerce, and as a result, Petitioner's request for 
attorney's fees must be denied. Therefore, this Court should 
affirm the sales tax, interest, and penalties assessed against 
Petitioner. j-Y 
DATED thi u^r day of June, 1993. 
GALE K. FRANCIS' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the abo\^/ 
Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage pre-paid on this rj? 
day of 1993 to the following: 
R. Bruce Johnson 
David J. Crapo 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) (1992): 
(a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over 
tangible personal property under Subsection 59-12-103(1), 
incident to the ownership or the leasing of that 
property, item, or service. 
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display, 
demonstration, or trial of that property in the regular 
course of business and held for resale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1992): 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount 
paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made 
within the state; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14) (1992): 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not 
regularly engaged in business, except the sale of 
vehicles or vessels required to be titled or registered 
under the laws of this state; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992): 
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded 
in as full or part payment of the purchase price, except 
that for purposes of calculating sales or use tax upon 
vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins are 
limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon 
the then existing fair market value of the vehicle being 
sold and the vehicle being traded in, as determined by 
the commission; 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992): 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from 
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in 
this chapter, except those time periods established for 
judicial review. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-13 (1989 & Supp 1992): 
(l)(a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued 
for which review by the agency or by a superior agency under 
Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would 
otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file 
a written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating 
the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of 
the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the 
agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the 
person making the request. 
(3)(a) The agency head, or a person designated for that 
purpose, shall issue a written order granting the request or 
denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for 
that purpose does not issue an order within 20 days 
after the filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 & Supp. 1992): 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of 
final agency action within 30 days after the date that the 
order constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-72S (1992): 
A. An even exchange of tangible personal property for tangible 
personal property is exempt from tax. When a person takes 
tangible personal property as part payment on a sale of 
tangible personal property, sales or use tax applies only to 
any consideration valued in money which changes hands. 
B. For example, if a car is sold for $8,500 and a credit of 
$6,500 is allowed for a used car taken in trade, the sales or 
use tax applies to the difference, or $2,000 in this example. 
Subsequently, when the used car is sold, tax applies to the 
selling price less any trade-in at that time. 
C. An actual exchange of tangible personal property between 
two persons must be made before this exemption applies. . . 
APPENDIX 2 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
KNOWLEDGE DATA SYSTEMS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 91-0934 
) Account No. D51752 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on April 13, 1992. Alan Hennebold, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Gary S. Kueltzo, manager of state and local taxes, 
participated by telephone for Petitioner. Rick Carlton, 
Assistant Utah Attorney General represented Respondent. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is use tax. 
2. The period in question is July 1987 through June 
1990. 
3. Respondent performed a sales and use tax 
compliance audit of Petitioner for the period in question. As 
a result of that audit, Respondent assessed additional use tax 
in the amount of $15,396.99 plus interest at the statutory rat-
of 12% per annum. 
Appeal No. 91-0934 
4- Petitioner filed a timely appeal of the foregoing 
assessment with the Commission. 
5. Petitioner is in the business of selling computer 
hardware and software at retail both inside and outside Utah. 
6. Petitioner sold a computer system to the 
University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic and took in trade 
used computer hardware which Petitioner had previously sold to 
them. 
7. The University of Minnesota is not in the 
business of selling new or used computer hardware, but rather 
is a patient, care facility. 
8. The equipment Petitioner took in trade was used 
*ff Petitioner in its business in Utah and was booked to a fixed 
asset account and was not held for subsequent sale in an 
inventory account. 
9. ICI America is in the business of selling 
wholesale pharmaceutical supplies and is not in the business of 
selling new or used computer hardware. 
10. Petitioner purchased used computer hardware from 
ICI In coniunction with providing a new computer system to ICI. 
11. Petitioner used a portion of the computer 
hardware itt7 its trade or business and held a portion of the 
hardware for resale in its inventory account. 
12. Neither the University of Minnesota nor ICI is 
registered with the Utah Department of Revenue to sell tangible 
personal property at retail in Utah. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Sales tax is levied on the purchaser for the amount 
paid or charged for retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1)(a)). 
Sales tax is not imposed on isolated or occasional 
sales by persons not regularly engaged in business. (Utah Code 
Ann, §59-12-104(14)). 
Use tax is levied on the purchaser for the amount paid 
or charged for tangible personal property stored, used or 
feofisumed in Utah. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(l)(l)). 
Generally, taxing statutes are to be construed 
strictly, and in favor of the taxpayer where doubtful. 
(Pacific Intermountain v. State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 144, 
146; 329 P.2d 650 (1958)). However, statutes which provide for 
exemptions to general taxation provisions are also strictly 
construed, and the taxpayer has the burden of showing its 
entitlement to the exemption. (Parsons Asphalt Products v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980)). 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The facts underlying this dispute are not £t issue. 
In summary, Petitioner took used equipment back in trade from 
the University of Minnesota and ICI America, for use in 
Petitioner's own business operations. Petitioner argues that 
the transactions are exempt from sales and use tax as isolated 
or occasional sales. Respondent argues that Petitioner s 
-3-
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initial purchase of the equipment was exempt from sales tax, 
but that its subsequent use of the equipment is subject to use 
tax. 
Utah Code Ann. S59-12-103( 1) (a) levies sales tax on 
the purchaser of tangible personal property sold within Utah. 
In this case, the parties agree that no sales tax may be levied 
on the transactions in question because the sales took place/ 
outside Utah. However, Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1X1) levies 
an alternative "use" tax on the purchaser of tangible personal 
property stored, used, or consumed in Utah. 
The equipment at issue in this case was used in Utah, 
and is therefore subject to use tax unless it falls within one 
of the specific exemptions set forth by statute. Petitioner 
relies upon the exemption found in Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-104(14), which exempts isolated or occasional sales by 
persons not regularly engaged in business from sales and use 
tax. However, it is not the sale of the equipment which is 
taxable, but only Petitioner's subsequent use of that equipment. 
-4-
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Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that 
Petitioner's use of used computer hardware taken in trade from 
the University of Minnesota and ICI America is subject to use 
tax under Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act. Respondent's audit 
assessment is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. 
this ^ day of Oc&Vt^' * DATED 
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Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Knowledge Data Systems 
c/o Richard Wolfley 
102 West 500 South, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Gary S. Kueltzo, Esq. 
30 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3600 
Chicago, IL 60606 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Rick Carlton 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
<?% day o f JOJL£SI& DATED this Vtf a  of f > 7>r£*V^ . 1992. 
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APPENDIX 3 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE* TAX COMMISSION 
KNOWLEDGE DATA SYSTEMS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax commission 
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, dated November 16, 1992, 
filed by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final 
-decision, dated October *». 1392. 
FINDINGS 
1. Utah Administrative Rule RB61-1-5A(P) provides 
that A .Petition fox Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for 
reconsideration either m mistake in lav ox fact, or the 
discovery of new evidence." Under this rule, the Tax 
:Xonmissiorr»ey exercise it» discretion In pasting -or .denying a 
Petition fox Reconsideration. 
ORDER 
Appeal No. 91-0934 
Account No. D51752 
2. In its Petition For Reconsideration, Petitioner 
raises what it considers to be errors of fact in the 
Commission'G prior decision. However/ as generally 
acknowledged by Petitioner, such alleged errors were not 
material to the Commission's prior decision in this matter. 
3. She primary point raised by Petitioner's Request 
For Reconsideration is as follows: Petitioner's acquisition of 
the used computer equipment in question was the result of 
isolated or occasional sales by the University of Minnesota and 
ICI. Utah Code Ann. $59-12-104(14) exempts isolated or 
occasional sales from sales tax. According to Petitioner the 
same exemption must be applied to Petitioner's subsequent use 
trff the equipmentf so as to preclude imposition of use tax. 
The Commission carefully considered the foregoing 
argument in reaching its initial decision in this matter. The 
Commission has again considered Petitioner's argument in 
connection with Petitioner's Request for Tteconsideraticn. The 
Commission continues to believe that although Petitioner's 
Initial purchase of the subject property is not subject to 
sales tax. Petitioner's subsequent use of the equipment in Utah 
Is subject to Utah's use tax. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order 
of the Utah State Tax Commission that the Petition for 
Reconsideration is denied. It is so ordered. 
PATED this /r) day of (_A^^J1 , l***-
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX 
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fe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
Roger 0. Tew 
Commissioner 
' S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
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review. Utah Code tan. SS63-4£b-13(l). 63-46b-l4<2)U), --
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-i * / V 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
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Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City. UT 64134 
Janes H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
iiebex X. Wells 3ldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Mark Wainwright 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State. #1100 
Salt .Lake City. UT a m i 
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DATED this ftf day of fjg 'tfr'Mtf • l***-
SBCXBX 
